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There is accumulating evidence that birds of prey are susceptible to fatal infection with highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI)
virus. We studied the antigenic, molecular, phylogenetic, and pathogenic properties of 2 HPAI H5N1 viruses isolated from dead
falcons in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 2005 and 2007, respectively. Phylogenetic and antigenic analyses grouped both isolates in
clade 2.2 (Qinghai-like viruses). However, the viruses appeared to have spread westward via diﬀerent ﬂyways. It remains unknown
how these viruses spread so rapidly from Qinghai after the 2005 outbreak and how they were introduced into falcons in these two
countries.TheH5N1outbreaksintheMiddleEastarebelievedbysometobemediatedbywildmigratorybirds.However,sporting
falcons may be at additional risk from the illegal import of live quail to feed them.
Copyright © 2009 Henju Marjuki et al.ThisisanopenaccessarticledistributedundertheCreativeCommonsAttributionLicense,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1.Introduction
Infection of birds of prey with highly pathogenic avian
inﬂuenza (HPAI) has been reported only in isolated cases.
In 2000, Manvel et al. reported the discovery of HPAI H7N3
isolated from a peregrine falcon [1]. Another HPAI virus
of the H7 subtype was found in a Saker falcon during
an outbreak in poultry in Italy in 2000 [2]. Hong Kong
has had a series of cases. In January 2004, Hong Kong
authorities conﬁrmed that a peregrine falcon had died
of H5N1 infection [3, 4]. In March 2006, HPAI H5N1
infections were discovered in another peregrine falcon [5].
Most recently, in March 2008, a wild peregrine falcon found
sick was conﬁrmed to be infected with H5N1 virus [6].
In Belgium, 2 crested hawk eagles (Spizaetus nipalensis)
smuggled from Thailand for a commercial raptor breeding
farm were discovered to be infected with HPAI H5N1
virus and were killed by authorities [7]. Kuwait reported
39 conﬁrmed cases of H5N1 infection in February 2007;
20 infected birds were falcons at a zoo and a farm in
Southern Kuwait, and the remainder were domestic birds
cagedoutdoors[8,9].TheﬁrstconﬁrmedcaseoflethalHPAI
H5N1infectioninSaudiArabiawasreportedinJanuary2006
in a Saker falcon [8]. In November 2007, an H5N1 outbreak
killed 1500 chickens at a farm in the Al-Kharj region of
Saudi Arabia, about 150 kilometers South of Riyadh [8]. No
human cases have been reported to date in Saudi Arabia or
Kuwait.
The increasing number of falcons infected with HPAI
H5N1 viruses demonstrates their susceptibility to these
pathogens. Because many falcon species are migratory or
occupy extensive territories, infected falcons may contribute
to the spread of avian inﬂuenza viruses within or between
countries. The best-studied falcon species are the peregrine
falcon(Falco peregrinus)andtheSakerfalcon(Falco cherrug),
which feed exclusively on live, medium-sized birds, such as
pigeons, shorebirds, waterfowl, and songbirds [10, 11]. The
susceptibility of some of these prey species to HPAI H5N1
infection [12] increases the risk of virus transmission to
falcons. Peregrine falcons, which can ﬂy and dive at high
speed, have long been used in the sport of falconry in the
Middle East. Although there is still no direct evidence of
virus transmission from falcons to humans, the practice of
falconry brings birds of prey into close contact with humans,2 Advances in Virology
thereby increasing the risk of transmission to humans or to
poultry.
It is not known how HPAI H5N1 virus spread so
rapidly westward after the 2005 outbreak at Qinghai Lake,
Western China, or how falcons in the Middle East con-
tracted HPAI H5N1 virus. To acquire information that
may answer these questions, we characterized two HPAI
H5N1 viruses isolated from dead female Saker falcons in
the region: A/Falcon/Saudi Arabia/D1795/2005 (Fa/SA/05)
and A/Falcon/Kuwait/D286/2007 (Fa/KW/07). The falcon
that died in Saudi Arabia was believed to have been in the
country for the past 2 years, and it seems highly likely that
thefalconhadbeenkeptincaptivityduringtheentireperiod.
The falcon had lost its appetite and was passing green feces
during its last 2 days of life. It was conﬁrmed to have died
of H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus [8]. Unfortunately, there is
no information available about the falcon found dead in
Kuwait. Organs removed from the two falcons were sent to
the Central Veterinary ResearchLaboratory in Dubai, United
ArabEmirates(UAE),inNovember2005andFebruary2007,
respectively.
2.MaterialsandMethods
2.1. Viruses and Cells. The H5N1 isolates Fa/SA/05 and
Fa/KW/07 were obtained from the Central Veterinary
Research Laboratory, Dubai, UAE, and stored in the
inﬂuenza virus repository of St. Jude Children’s Research
Hospital. All experiments were conducted in a USDA-
approvedbiosafetylevel(BSL)3+containmentfacility.Stock
viruses were prepared by inoculating ﬁeld samples into the
allantoic cavities of 10-day-old embryonated chicken eggs
and incubating them at 35◦C for 48 hours. Aliquots of
stock viruses were stored at −80◦C. Madin-Darby canine
kidney (MDCK) cells were obtained from the American
Type Culture Collection (Manassas, Va, USA) and main-
tained in Dulbecco’s Modiﬁed Eagle’s Medium (DMEM)
supplemented with 10% fetal calf serum and 1% antibiotics
(penicillin/streptomycin).
2.2. Infectivity. The 50% tissue culture infectious dose
(TCID50) was determined in MDCK cells after incubation at
37◦C for 3 days, and the 50% egg infectious dose (EID50)w a s
determined in 10-day-old embryonated chicken eggs after 40
hours of incubation at 35◦C. TCID50 and EID50 values were
calculated by the method of Reed and Muench [13].
2.3. Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis of Inﬂuenza Virus
Genes. Viral RNA was isolated from virus-containing allan-
toic ﬂuid with the RNeasy Mini kit (Qiagen, Valencia, Calif,
USA), and one-step RT-PCR (Qiagen) was done with a
universal primer set [14] .P C Rp r o d u c t sw e r ep u r i ﬁ e db y
using the QIAquick PCR puriﬁcation and gel extraction kits
(Qiagen). Sequencing was performed by the Hartwell Center
for Bioinformatics and Biotechnology at St. Jude using
BigDye Terminator (v.3; Perkin Elmer Applied Biosystems,
Foster City, Calif, USA) chemistry and synthetic oligonu-
cleotides. Phylogenetic analysis was based on the HA and
NA genes. Selected HA and NA sequences from H5N1
viruses isolated after 1996/1997 were downloaded from
the Inﬂuenza Sequence Database at Los Alamos National
Laboratory (http://www.ﬂu.lanl.gov/)[ 15]. Sequences were
compared by using the ClustalW alignment algorithm with
the BioEdit Sequence Alignment Editor. To estimate phylo-
genetic relationships, nucleotide sequences were analyzed by
the neighbor-joining method with 100 bootstraps by using
the phylogeny inference package (PHYLIP) version 3.65.
2.4. Pathogenicity in Chickens, Ducks, and Mice. All animal
studies were conducted under applicable laws and guide-
lines and after approval from the St. Jude Animal Care
and Use Committee. The pathogenicity of the two falcon
H5N1 isolates in chickens was determined in groups of 3
(Fa/SA/05, stock virus concentration: 108.769 EID50/mL) or
10 (Fa/KW/07, stock virus concentration: 109.231 EID50/mL)
6-week-old, speciﬁc-pathogen-free white leghorn chickens
(Gallus gallus domesticus) by intravenous injection with
0.1mL of 10-fold dilutions of virus-containing allantoic
ﬂuid. The chickens were examined daily for 10 days for
clinical signs of disease and for mortality. The experiment
was stopped after the birds found dead within 24 hours
postinoculation (p.i.).
Pathogenicity in mallards was determined as described
previously [16]. Groups of ﬁve 5-week-old Mallard ducks
(Anas platyrhynchos) were inoculated with 106 EID50 of virus
in a 1-mL volume (0.3mL each was applied to the trachea
and the throat, and 0.2mL each to nares and eyes). All birds
wereobserveddailyforclinicalsignsandmortalityovera10-
day period. Tracheal and cloacal swabs were collected every
otherdaystartingonday3p.i.,andviraltiters(TCID50)w er e
determined.
The pathogenicity of the two falcon H5N1 isolates in
mammals was determined in female 6-week-old BALB/c
mice. Groups of mice (n = 3) were inoculated intranasally
with 100 plaque-forming units (PFUs) of virus in 50µLo f
PBS. Brain, lungs, liver, spleen, and blood were collected
from 3 mice in each group on days 3, 6, and 9p.i. to evaluate
organ tropism. Organs were homogenized in 1mL of PBS,
and virus was titrated (log10 TCID50/mL) in MDCK cells.
2.5. Hemagglutinin Inhibition (HI) Assay Using H5N1 Fer-
ret Antisera. Ferrets obtained through the ferret breeding
program at St. Jude or from Marshall Farms (North Rose,
NY, USA) were intranasally inoculated with 106 EID50 of
virus in 1mL of PBS under isoﬂurane anesthesia. Serum
was collected on day 21p.i. or 10 days after a boost dose of
1mL of a 1 : 10 dilution of stock virus in PBS by footpad
injection or intranasal inoculation. The antisera were treated
with receptor-destroying enzyme and used for HI assay as
previously described by Palmer et al. [17].
3. Results
3.1. Antigenic Characterization. We assessed the relation of
the falcon H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses to other H5N1 viruses by
hemagglutinininhibition(HI)assaywithapanelofreferenceAdvances in Virology 3
Table 1: Antigenic analysis of Fa/SA/05 and Fa/KW/07 hemagglutinin using ferret polyclonal antisera. <: HI antibody titer less than
40. The HI titer for the homologous virus and antiserum is indicated by bold/underline. Viruses: HK213 (A/Hong Kong/213/03),
VN1203 (A/Vietnam/1203/04), CkPak (A/Chicken/Pakistan(Lahore)/NARC/3320/4/06), FaSA (A/Falcon/Saudi Arabia/D1795/05), FaKW
(A/Falcon/Kuwait/D286/06), JweHK (A/Japanese White Eye/Hong Kong/1038/06), and dkLao25 (A/Duck/Laos/25/06).
HI titer against ferret antiserum to
Clade Virus rgHK213 rgVN1203 CkPak FaSA FaKW JweHK dkLao25
1 rgHK213 320 320 1280 640 160 640 80
1 rgVN1203 < 160 40 80 << <
2.2 CkPak << 320 160 640 <<
2.2 FaSA << 160 160 160 <<
2.2 FaKW << 320 40 320 40 <
2.3 JweHK 160 80 80 40 40 320 640
2.3 dkLao25 << < 40 <<160
sera collected from ferrets challenged with various H5N1
isolates representing clades 1, 2.2, and 2.3. The two falcon
H5N1 isolates had slightly diﬀerent reactivity patterns (see
Table 1). Both viruses had relatively high HI titers (160 for
Fa/SA/05 and 320 for Fa/KW/07) against A/chicken/Pakistan
(Lahore)/NARC2411.A/06 (clade 2.2) antiserum, suggesting
that they are closely related to the H5N1 virus from that
region and to viruses of clade 2.2. The Fa/KW/07 virus was
not highly reactive with antisera generated against Fa/SA/05,
suggesting that the two isolates diﬀer antigenically despite
their common origin.
3.2. Molecular Characterization. There were 4 amino acid
diﬀerencesintheirHAproteinsatpositions12,178,512,and
553.Theaminoacidatposition178islocatedclosetotheHA
receptor binding sites (H5 HA numbering). The HA proteins
of both viruses contained multiple basic amino acids at the
connecting peptide between HA1 and HA2 (PQGERRRKKR
at positions 321–330), which is a characteristic of inﬂuenza
viruses that are highly pathogenic in chickens [18, 19].
Interestingly, the HA cleavage site of the two falcon H5N1
viruses diﬀered in a single basic amino acid (R>G) from
that of their ancestor viruses Gs/Gd/1/96 and Ck/HK/220/97
and from that of H5N1 viruses isolated in 2004 in Thailand,
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Eastern China (PQRERRRKKR).
We also analyzed the amino acids of the polymerase
genes. A change at position 627 of the PB2 protein from
glutamic acid (E) to lysine (K) was required for the high
virulence of the 1997 H5N1 viruses in mice [20, 21]a n d
for that of H7N7 viruses in humans [22]. Sequence analysis
revealed a lysine at that position in both isolates, suggesting
that both are lethal to mice. The PB1 and PA proteins of
the two H5N1 isolates possessed tyrosine at position 436
and threonine at position 515. In contrast, the T515>A
amino acid change in PA and the Y436>H change in PB1
were previously shown to abrogate the pathogenicity of
H5N1 constructs in ducks, and the Y436>Hm u t a t i o ni n
PB1 reduced transmission eﬃciency in ducks. The T515>A
mutation in PA eliminated virus lethality in ducks but not in
mice and ferrets [16].
3.3.PotentialSensitivitytoAntiviralTreatment. Amantadine-
resistant inﬂuenza A variants carry amino acid substitutions
at residues 26, 27, 30, 31, or 34 of the M2 protein [23, 24].
Nosubstitutionsattheseresidueswereidentiﬁedbysequence
analysis in either H5N1 virus (see Table 2), suggesting that
both are potentially sensitive to M2 inhibitors. Mutations in
conserved NA framework or catalytic residues (amino acid
residues 119, 274, 292, and 294, N2 numbering) may reduce
virus sensitivity to NA inhibitors [25]. No substitutions were
observed in the conserved NA residues of the studied H5N1
viruses (see Table 2), suggesting that they may be sensitive to
neuraminidase inhibitors.
3.4. Phylogenetic Analysis. T h eH Aa n dN Ap h y l o g e n e t i c
trees were rooted to the HA and NA genes of A/Chicken/
Hong Kong/220/97 virus. The HA gene of the Fa/SA/05 virus
was phylogenetically closely related to that of viruses isolated
in 2006 from chickens in Israel and Gaza (clade 2.2), whereas
the HA gene of Fa/KW/07 was closely related to that of a
virusisolatedin2007fromchickens inRussia(clade2.2)(see
Figure 1). On the basis of this analysis, both were assigned
to subclade 2 of clade 2 of H5 HA. The viruses clustered
phylogenetically with 2005–2007 isolates from Asia, Africa,
and the Middle East (see Figure 1).
The general topology of the N1 tree diﬀers from that of
the HA tree because of diﬀerences in stalk length. There is a
20-amino acid deletion in the stalk region (positions 49 to
68) in the current 2003–2007 and 2001-2002 China poultry
isolates. A 19-amino acid deletion (positions 50 to 68) was
observed in the H5N1/97 Hong Kong human and poultry
isolates. Both of the falcon H5N1 viruses had a 20-amino
acid deletion in the stalk region of NA. The NA gene of the
Fa/SA/05 virus was phylogenetically closely related to that of
A/chicken/Egypt/1129N3-HK9/2007 (clade2.2),whereasthe
NA gene of Fa/KW/07 was phylogenetically closely related
to that of A/chicken/Afghanistan/1207/2006 (clade 2.2) (see
Figure 2).
3.5. Organ Tropism in a Mouse Model. To determine the
pathogenicity of the two falcon H5N1 isolates in a mam-
malian host, we inoculated BALB/c mice intranasally and
measured virus replication in the brain, lungs, liver, spleen,
and blood. Inoculation with 100PFU of Fa/KW/07 virus
resulted in high virus titers (mean 107.35 TCID50/mL) in the
lungs on day 3p.i.; titers had declined slightly on days 64 Advances in Virology
Table 2: Amino acid (aa) residues associated with virus sensitivity and resistance to antiviral drugs.
Protein M2 NA
aa position 26 27 30 31 34 119 274 292 294
Sensitive L V A S G E H R N
Resistant F A/T/S/G V/T/S N/G E V/G/A/D Y K S
Fa/SA/05 L V A S G E H R N
Fa/KW/07 L V A S G E H R N
A/Chicken/Gaza/450/2006
A/Chicken/Israel/397/2006
A/Falcon/Saudi Arabia/D1795/2005
A/Whooping swan/Mongolia/244/2005
A/Chicken/sudan/1784-7/2006
A/Chicken/Suzdalka/12/05
A/Chicken/Russia Krasnodar/2/2007
A/Falcon/Kuwait/D286/2007
A/Cygnus olor/Astrakhan/Ast05-2-1/2005
A/Chicken/Nigeria/1047-34/2006
A/Bar headed goose/Qinghai/2/2005
A/Crow/Osaka/102/2004
A/Chicken/Indonesia/Kulon1631-47/2006
A/Chicken/Indonesia/Magelang1631-57/2007
A/Crested eagle/Belgium/01/2004
A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/1997
100
76
69
46
40
68
83
30
81
100
99
100
95
Clade 0
Clade 2.1
Clade 2.2
Clade 2.5
Clade 2.3
Figure 1: Phylogenetic relationships based on the HA (nucleotides 1–1684) genes of the Fa/SA/05 and Fa/KW/07 viruses. The nucleotide
sequences were analyzed by PHYLIP 3.65 software using the neighbor-joining method with 100 bootstraps. The tree was rooted to the HA
gene of A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/97. Viruses in bold red type were characterized in this study. Clades are indicated.
and 9p.i. (see Figure 3). Virus titers of Fa/SA/05 virus were
approximately 1 log lower than those of Fa/KW/07 on all
days studied. On day 6p.i., the mean Fa/KW/07 virus titer
in the brain was 105.07 TCID50/mL and that of Fa/SA/05 was
103.02 TCID50/mL (see Figure 3). Virus was detected in the
spleens of mice inoculated with Fa/KW/07 virus only 3 and
6 days p.i. All mice inoculated with either falcon H5N1 virus
died by day 9p.i.
3.6. Virulence and Pathogenicity in Avian Species. To deter-
mine whether the two falcon H5N1 isolates retained
pathogenicity for avian species, we inoculated 6-week-
old, speciﬁc-pathogen-free white leghorn chickens by intra-
venous injection. Both viruses caused 100% mortality within
24 hours.
We then inoculated 2 groups of 5 mallard ducks via
natural routes (trachea, throat, nares, and eyes) with 106
EID50 of Fa/SA/05 and Fa/KW/07 stock virus. All ducks
survivedduringthe10-dayobservationperiod.Clinicalsigns
(cloudy eyes and ataxia) were observed in 2 of 5 ducks on
day5afterinoculationwithFa/KW/07.Fa/SA/05causedonly
cloudyeyesin1of5ducksduringdays5to7p.i.Trachealand
cloacal swabs were collected every other day starting on day
3p.i. Both viruses were shed from the trachea on day 3p.i.
(see Figure 4), and Fa/KW/07 virus was detected in cloacal
samples on day 3p.i. No virus was detected in specimens
obtained on days 5, 7, and 10p.i.
4. Discussion
Accumulating data demonstrate that falcons are extremely
susceptible to HPAI H5N1 infection. We investigated the
molecular, phylogenetic, antigenic, and pathogenic prop-
erties of 2 H5N1 viruses isolated from dead falcons inAdvances in Virology 5
A/Cygnus cygnus/Iran/754/2006
A/Chicken/Moscow/2/2007
A/Falcon/Kuwait/D286/07
A/Chicken/Afganistan/1207/2006
A/Chicken/Egypt/1129N3-HK9/2007
A/Falcon/Saudi Arabia/D1795/05
A/Duck/Novosibirsk/02/05
A/Cygnus olor/Astrakhan/Ast05-2-1/2005
A/Chicken/Nigeria/1047-30/2006
A/Whooper swan/Qinghai/1/2005
A/Chicken/Indonesia/CDC24/2005
A/Chicken/Indonesia/11/2003
A/Crow/Osaka/102/2004
A/Crested eagle/Belgium/01/2004
A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/1997
45
39
39
80
27
44
26
20
25
65
24
60
100
Clade 0
Clade 2.1
Clade 2.2
Clade 2.5
Clade 2.3
Figure 2: Phylogenetic relationships based on the NA (nucleotides–1388) genes of Fa/SA/05 and Fa/KW/07 viruses. The nucleotide
sequences were analyzed by PHYLIP3.65 software using the neighbor-joining method with 100 bootstraps. The NA phylogenetic tree was
rooted to the NA gene of A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/97. Viruses in bold red type were characterized in this study. Clades are indicated.
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Figure 3: Mean titers of Fa/SA/05 and Fa/KW/07 viruses in mouse
organ homogenates. Mice were inoculated with 100PFU of each
stock virus. Dashed line indicates detection limit (10TCID50/mL).
BLD:belowlevelofdetection.ErrorbarsareSDobtainedfrommice
(n = 3) killed at various times.
the Middle East. Phylogenetic and antigenic analyses indi-
cated that both viruses originated from Qinghai-like H5N1
viruses that caused a massive die-oﬀ among wild birds in
China in 2005. However, it is still not clear how these
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Figure 4: Mean (±SE) tracheal and cloacal virus titers in mallard
ducks inoculated with Fa/SA/05 and Fa/KW/07 viruses. Ducks
(n = 5) were inoculated with 106 EID50 of each stock virus.
Virus was tittered from tracheal and cloacal swabs collected 3 days
after inoculation to determine the TCID50. Dashed line indicates
detection limit (10TCID50/mL). BLD: below level of detection.
viruses were introduced into the region, and how the
falcons in the aﬀected countries contracted the HPAI H5N1
virus.6 Advances in Virology
There are several possibilities that may explain the
introduction of these viruses. Since no cases of H5N1
infection were reported in the Middle East before 2005,
the ﬁrst possibility is that the virus was introduced by wild
birds migrating westward after the 2005 outbreak in China.
The virus rapidly spread westward through various regions,
including the Middle East [26], and subsequently spread
to domestic poultry and probably to other avian species,
including falcons.
A second possibility is that the virus was introduced
by infected falcons illegally imported into the Middle East
from China, Mongolia, or Russia. Thousands of wild-caught
falcons are traded on the black market withoutveterinary
inspection, licensing from the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, or
border controls [27]. Illegal trading of falcons can contribute
to the global spread and transmission of HPAI viruses, and
therefore export/import activity should be strictly regulated.
As an example, falcons brought into the UAE must be
quarantined for 21 days; blood and nasal mucus are tested
during the ﬁrstand second weeks forH5N1 virus [28].These
extraordinary security measures have so far prevented any
cases of HPAI H5N1 infection in falcons in the UAE.
A third possibility is that the falcons were infected via
diseased pigeons and/or quail, which are their normal food
source. To feed hunting falcons, tens of thousands of live
quail areﬂown from the Arabian Gulf into royal falconry
camps across Central Asia without veterinary inspection
[27]. Many falcons in North America, Germany, and the
Persian Gulf area have died after feeding on birds (especially
pigeons and quail) and other prey infected with avian
inﬂuenza viruses [29]. Therefore, falcons in captivity should
be fed only birds that have been inspected by a veterinarian.
The phylogenetic tree of H5 HA revealed that although
the two falcon H5N1 viruses originated from the same
ancestor viruses (clade 2.2, Qinghai-like), they are likely
to have spread westward via diﬀerent ﬂyways. Because the
HA of Fa/SA/05 shares strong sequence similarity with the
HAs of 2006 chicken isolates from Gaza and Israel, this
virus appears to have spread from Qinghai Lake toward
the African continent via a “southern” ﬂyway. In contrast,
the HA of Fa/KW/07 is closely related to that of a 2007
chicken isolate from Russia, suggesting that the Kuwaiti
isolate was carried toward Europe via a “northern” ﬂyway.
The two viruses showed slightly diﬀerent reactivity patterns
with antisera from ferrets inoculated with various H5N1
viruses. The fact that the Fa/KW/07 virus was poorly reactive
with antisera is generated against the Fa/SA/05 virus (see
Table 1), suggesting that it may have undergone minor
antigenic drift in its HA gene. In addition, the fourfold
diﬀerence between the homologous and heterologous titer
also suggests only minor antigenic diﬀerences. Therefore,
based on this observation, an indication of diﬀerent origin
of isolates should be predicated on the HA phylogenetic
analysis rather than on the slight antigenic diﬀerences of the
two falcon isolates. Furthermore, sequence analysis revealed
a 20-amino acid deletion in the NA stalks of both viruses;
this feature is a characteristic of chicken-adapted inﬂuenza
viruses.
Interestingly, although both falcon H5N1 isolates were
uniformly lethal to chickens, their replication was limited
in mallard ducks. Only about one third of inoculated ducks
showed clinical signs of illness, and virus was shed only on
day 3p.i. (see Figure 4). This low pathogenicity may allow
ducks to passively carry and shed these and other HPAI
H5N1 viruses.
The Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti falcon H5N1 viruses
were replicated in multiple mouse organs, particularly brain
and lungs, without prior adaptation (see Figure 3). H5N1
inﬂuenza virus lethality and spread to the brain in mice
usually require multiple passages for adaptation [30]. The
high lethality of these isolates in mice is probably related to
the K627 residue of the PB2 protein [20, 21]. Interestingly,
the PB2s of all H5N1 viruses isolated from humans and
those of all avian H5N1 isolates from the recent outbreaks in
Qinghai Lake (Western China), Russia, and Nigeria, possess
lysine (K) at position 627 [21, 31], whereas the PB2s of their
progenitor avian viruses contain glutamic acid (E) at this
position.
All subtypes of inﬂuenza A virus have the potential to
becomepandemic strains, butthecurrentlycirculating HPAI
H5N1 viruses are of greatest concern. Our study provides
the ﬁrst molecular and biological insights into the HPAI
H5N1 viruses isolated from dead falcons in the Middle
East. This information will be useful in determining which
measures should be taken to provide eﬀective surveillance
and protection of these birds in the aﬀected countries and
aroundtheglobe.Duringthepreparationofthismanuscript,
Lierz et al. [31] reported that falcons survived HPAI H5N1
infection after vaccination with inactivated H5N2 virus. The
vaccinated birds did shed virus but at reduced titers. This
approach may provide a partial solution to the protection of
falcons in captivity.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by Grants A195357,
A157570, and CA21765 and Contract no. HHSN26620070-
0005C from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services and by the American Lebanese Syrian Associated
Charities (ALSAC). The authors gratefully acknowledge edi-
torial assistance of Sharon Naron, the administrative assis-
tance of James Knowles, the technical support of Natasha
Lyushina and Jacco Boon, and the contributions of the
Hartwell Center for Bioinformatics & Biotechnology and
the Animal Resources Center at St. Jude Children’s Research
Hospital.
References
[1] R. J. Manvell, P. McKinney, U. Wernery, and K. Frost,
“Isolation of a highly pathogenic inﬂuenza A virus of subtype
H7N3 from a peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus),” Avian
Pathology, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 635–637, 2000.
[2] S.Magnino,M.Fabbi,A.Moreno,etal.,“Avianinﬂuenzavirus
(H7 serotype) in a saker falcon in Italy,” Veterinary Record, vol.
146, no. 25, p. 740, 2000.Advances in Virology 7
[3] Avian Inﬂuenza, Falcon - China (Hong Kong), archive num-
ber: 20040127.0314, January 2004, http://www.promedmail
.org/.
[4] The New York Times, “Dead falcon in Hong Kong found to
be infected with bird ﬂu,” January 2004, http://query.nytimes
.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B06E6D61339F931A15752C0A9
629C8B63&scp=2&sq=falcon+H5N1&st=nyt.
[5] China Daily, “Falcon dies of H5N1 bird ﬂu in HK,” March
2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/27/con-
tent 552831.htm.
[6] Hong Kong’s Information Services Department, “Peregrine
Falcon tests positive for H5N1 virus,” March 2008, http://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200803/14/P200803140213.htm.
[7] S. Van Borm, I. Thomas, G. Hanquet, et al., “Highly
pathogenic H5N1 inﬂuenza virus in smuggled Thai eagles,
Belgium,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 702–
705, 2005.
[8] Reuters, “Kuwait ﬁnds H5N1 bird ﬂu in chicken, falcon,”
March 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL02152052-
20070302.
[9] Avian inﬂuenza - Eurasia (37): Saudi Arabia, falcon. Promed,
archive number: 20060130.0299, January 2006, http://www
.promedmail.org/.
[10] Cornell Lab of Ornithology, “Peregrine Falcon,” May 2008,
http://www.birds.cornell.edu/AllAboutBirds/BirdGuide/Pere-
grine Falcon.html.
[11] C. M. White, N. J. Clum, T. J. Cade, and W. G. Hunt,
“Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus),” in The Birds of North
America No. 660,A .P o o l ea n dF .G i l l ,E d s . ,T h eB i r d so fN o rt h
America, Philadelphia, Pa, USA, 2002.
[12] A. C. M. Boon, M. R. Sandbulte, P. Seiler, et al., “Role of
terrestrial wild birds in ecology of inﬂuenza A virus (H5N1),”
Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 1720–1724,
2007.
[13] L. J. Reed and H. Muench, “A simple method for estimating
ﬁfty percent endpoints,” American Journal of Hygiene, vol. 27,
pp. 493–497, 1938.
[14] E. Hoﬀmann, J. Stech, Y. Guan, R. G. Webster, and D. R. Perez,
“Universal primer set for the full-length ampliﬁcation of all
inﬂuenza A viruses,” Archives of Virology, vol. 146, no. 12, pp.
2275–2289, 2001.
[15] C. Macken, H. Lu, J. Goodman, and L. Boykin, “The value of
a database in surveillance and vaccine selection,” in Options
for the Control of Inﬂuenza IV,A .D .M .E .O s t e r h a u s ,N .
Cox, and A. W. Hampson, Eds., pp. 103–106, Elsevier Science,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2001.
[ 1 6 ]D .J .H u l s e - P o s t ,K .M .S t u r m - R a m i r e z ,J .H u m b e r d ,e ta l . ,
“Role of domestic ducks in the propagation and biological
evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses in
Asia,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, vol. 102, no. 30, pp. 10682–10687,
2005.
[17] D. Palmer, M. Coleman, W. Dowdle, and G. Schild, “Advanced
laboratory techniques for inﬂuenza diagnosis,” US Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, Atlanta, Ga, USA,
1975.
[18] E. C. J. Claas, A. D. M. E. Osterhaus, R. van Beek,
et al., “Human inﬂuenza A H5N1 virus related to a highly
pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus,” The Lancet, vol. 351, no.
9101, pp. 472–477, 1998.
[19] T. Horimoto and Y. Kawaoka, “Reverse genetics provides
direct evidence for a correlation of hemagglutinin cleavability
and virulence of an avian inﬂuenza A virus,” Journal of
Virology, vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 3120–3128, 1994.
[20] H. Hatta, P. Gao, P. Halfmann, and Y. Kawaoka, “Molecular
basis for high virulence of Hong Kong H5N1 inﬂuenza a
viruses,” Science, vol. 293, no. 5536, pp. 1840–1842, 2001.
[21] K. Shinya, S. Hamm, M. Hatta, H. Ito, T. Ito, and Y. Kawaoka,
“PB2 amino acid at position 627 aﬀects replicative eﬃciency,
but not cell tropism, of Hong Kong H5N1 inﬂuenza A viruses
in mice,” Virology, vol. 320, no. 2, pp. 258–266, 2004.
[22] R. A. M. Fouchier, P. M. Schneeberger, F. W. Rozendaal,
et al., “Avian inﬂuenza A virus (H7N7) associated with human
conjunctivitis and a fatal case of acute respiratory distress
syndrome,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America, vol. 101, no. 5, pp. 1356–1361,
2004.
[23] A. J. Hay, A. J. Wolstenholme, J. J. Skehel, and M. H. Smith,
“The molecular basis of the speciﬁc anti-inﬂuenza action of
amantadine,” The EMBO Journal, vol. 4, no. 11, pp. 3021–
3024, 1985.
[24] L. H. Pinto, L. J. Holsinger, and R. A. Lamb, “Inﬂuenza virus
M2 protein has ion channel activity,” Cell,v o l .6 9 ,n o .3 ,p p .
517–528, 1992.
[25] L. V. Gubareva, “Molecular mechanisms of inﬂuenza virus
resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors,” Virus Research, vol.
103, no. 1-2, pp. 199–203, 2004.
[26] R. G. Webster and E. A. Govorkova, “H5N1 inﬂuenza—
continuing evolution and spread,” The New England Journal
of Medicine, vol. 355, no. 21, pp. 2174–2177, 2006.
[27] The Union for the Conservation of Raptors, Another
peregrine falcon infected with H5N1 avian ﬂu, March 2006,
http://www.savethefalcons.org/another falcon with avian ﬂu
.asp.
[28] Gulf News, “Falcons placed in quarantine to reduce risk,”
February 2006, http://archive.gulfnews.com/indepth/bird ﬂu/
index.html.
[29] Arab News, Falcon expert warns of H5N1 threat, January
2008, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article
=105465&d=9&m=1&y=2008&pix=kingdom.jpg&
category=Kingdom.
[30] K.F.Shortridge,N. N.Zhou,Y.Guan, et al.,“Characterization
of avian H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses from poultry in Hong Kong,”
Virology, vol. 252, no. 2, pp. 331–342, 1998.
[31] M. Lierz, H. M. Hafez, R. Klopﬂeisch, et al., “Protection and
virus shedding of falcons vaccinated against highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza A virus (H5N1),” Emerging Infectious Diseases,
vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 1667–1674, 2007.